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| The Austin Dam Author's Photo |
Hidden within the wilds of Potter County lie the skeletal remains of a once impressive structure. Within these crumbling ruins lies a tragic story. Though the lessons learned from this catastrophic event brought about great change, it took the loss of human life to set them in motion. This is the story of the Austin Dam Disaster.
By the first decade of the 20th Century, the surrounding mountains had been largely denuded of standing timber and the days of logging were waning. Only trees too small to saw into lumber remained. To make use of these “left overs,” George C. Bayless of Binghamton, New York formed the Bayless Pulp & Paper Company and constructed a paper mill in Austin. His mill would ensure that employment for the town would continue even after logging ceased.
To provide the necessary power and water to run the mill, an earthen dam was built on Freeman Run. By 1909, the earthen dam proved inadequate to power the expanding mill. A newer larger dam would be required to remedy this issue. Thus, the chain of events that would inevitably lead to disaster was initiated.
Thomas Chalkley Hatten of Wilmington, Delaware was hired by George Bayless to design and build the new concrete dam. Construction began in May 1909. Hatten’s design for the dam was relatively sound based on engineering principles of the time. However, pressure and meddling from Bayless to reduce costs and expedite construction would force him to make drastic alterations to his plans.
One of the design elements Bayless meddled with was the dam's cut-off wall, an underground concrete barrier whose purpose was to prevent water from seeping under the structure. Hatten intended it to extend eleven feet underground. Bayless concluded that a wall of only four feet would be sufficient. Hatten conceded.
A gatehouse equipped with valves to control the discharge of water was another initial design Hatton had envisioned. To reduce costs, Bayless eliminated the gatehouse and valves. Only a single pipe at the base of the dam would be implemented. The only mechanism to control the discharge of water through the pipe was a simple wooden cap.
Layer by layer the dam grew higher. Unbeknownst to Hatten, Bayless had instructed a contractor to increase the height of the dam and spillway by 2 feet. When Hatten discovered this, he confronted Bayless. Hatten provided calculations that indicated that the integrity of the dam would be affected, Bayless was unmoved.
By itself, concrete is rather weak and requires strengthening by adding metal rods called re-bar. Bayless once again inserted himself into the dam’s construction by limiting the amount of metal rods used in the body of the dam and those used to anchor it to the rock layers beneath it. The temperature at which concrete is poured is also integral to its strength. As construction labored on into the colder months, concrete being poured took longer to possess its full strength.
By December 1st, the 540 ft. long and nearly 50ft. high dam was finished and began impounding water for the mill. Not long after its completion, vertical cracks became visible along the face of the dam that divided it into distinct sections. Contraction of the uncured concrete was found to be the cause and written off as just superficial.
Just one month after its completion, Mother Nature provided a warning that foreshadowed the future catastrophe. In January 1910, heavy rain combine and snow melt filled the reservoir to beyond capacity, forcing water over the spillway for the first time. A properly constructed dam should have been able to withstand this pressure, however this dam was anything but that.
The solution to the problem was not surprising given the mentality of George C. Bayless. Dynamite was used to blast a hole below the crest of the dam. Another charge was lowered on a rope to blow the cap off the outlet pipe at the base of the dam. Water streamed through these openings and averted a potential disaster.
Hatten blamed the incident on two factors. The first was insufficiently cured concrete due to cold temperatures. Seepage under the dam was the second catalyst, which had enabled the dam to slide upon its own foundation. Following the incident, Hatten advised adding a rock buttress to strengthen the dam. Bayless promptly ignored it. Within a month’s time, the dam was repaired and was once again holding back water, however significant leakage from under the dam continued. For Bayless it was back to business as normal. Mother Nature had given George Bayless a warning that his dam was structurally unsound. Bayless allowed this warning to go unheeded. She would not be this courteous a second time...
Heavy rains once again filled the reservoir in mid-September 1911. This was the first time since the partial failure in January 1910 that the dam had been stressed by such a force. By the 30th, it was reported that the water level was within a half-inch of the spillway. Opening the outlet pipe was deemed unnecessary as it would hamper production at the mill.
Around 2:15 PM, the dam could no longer hold back the 200 million gallons pushing against it. It instantaneously failed, fracturing into sections as it burst. A wave of water over 20ft high began rushing the 1 1/2 miles towards Austin. Clara Brooks, the owner of a brothel above the dam, witnessed the failure and telephoned downtown Austin to warn them of the approaching danger.
Bayless' paper mill was the first to suffer the wrath of the flood. It picked up logs neatly stacked behind the mill and transformed them into missiles that shattered anything in their path. This unstoppable force then reached the town itself. Within seconds, Austin was reduced to matchsticks. Now filled with debris, the surge continued downstream until it met the village of Costello. Here the devastation was repeated on a similar level.
When the water receded and residents returned to what had been their homes, the arduous task of locating the victims began. At least 78 lives are known to have perished, although we may never know the true number of fatalities. Damages were estimated at $3-6 million, or $76-150 million in today’s dollars.
An investigation was launched into the cause of the failure. What was found was essentially a repeat of the January 1910 incident only on a more catastrophic scale. The dam had slid upon its own foundation caused by water seeping under the dam. One of the investigators concluded that, “failure of this dam is due to sliding as a result of faulty foundation, faulty design, faulty construction, and faulty operation.”
Societal factors also contributed to the disaster. Bayless’ mill provided employment for the town of Austin. Economic dependence kept townspeople from confronting Bayless about the unsafe dam following the 1910 partial failure. One of the few that spoke up was local grocer and politician William Nelson. Several times he confronted the paper company to lower the dam and conduct repairs. Nelson’s pleas for action were ignored and he was mocked by his fellow citizens when he tried to forewarn them that the town was in imminent danger. Nelson and his wife later perished in the disaster.
The findings of the investigation ultimately led to the state of Pennsylvania adopting dam safety regulations two years later in 1913. These regulations gave the state the authority to oversee dam design, construction, and operation. Hatten placed all the blame upon himself rather than on George Bayless. He was never charged for the disaster. Bayless was indicted on manslaughter charges, but these were later dismissed.
The survivors of Austin and Costello eventually rebuilt their towns, but neither would ever be the same. Nothing could bring back what that warm September day had taken. Bayless’ mill was rebuilt and continued to operate into the 1940’s, before flooding and eventually fire silenced it forever. Both towns still exist today in the quiet picturesque wilderness of Potter County. Though the physical scars of the disaster have long since faded, the faces and the names lost on that day will never be forgotten. The fractured dam still sits in the exact same position it was when it failed over a century ago. It’s now a central part of the Austin Dam Memorial Park, which is dedicated to telling the story of this tragic event.
Information Retrieved From:
Austin (Bayless) Dam (Pennsylvania, 1911).(2019). Retrieved from https://damfailures.org/case-study/austin-bayless-dam-pennsylvania-1911/
Guidon, M. (2010). The dam that could not break, austin 1911. Retrieved from http://pabook2.libraries.psu.edu/palitmap/AustinDam.html
Jones, A. (2013, September) Memorial marker at base of Austin Dam recalls flood. The Bradford Era. Retrieved From http://www.bradfordera.com/news/memorial-marker-at-base-of-austin-dam-recalls-flood/article_85445dfe-2971-11e3-b701-001a4bcf887a.html
Pashek Associates, & Abertin Vernon, (2011).
The dam park at austin: master plan and economic development strategies. Retrieved from https://planningpa.org/wp-content/uploads/The-Dam-Park-at-Austin-Master-Plan.pdf
Rose, Andrew T., "Using the 1911 Austin Dam Failure Case History in Undergraduate Teaching" (2013). International Conference on Case Histories in Geotechnical Engineering. 46. https://scholarsmine.mst.edu/icchge/7icchge/session01/46
Layer by layer the dam grew higher. Unbeknownst to Hatten, Bayless had instructed a contractor to increase the height of the dam and spillway by 2 feet. When Hatten discovered this, he confronted Bayless. Hatten provided calculations that indicated that the integrity of the dam would be affected, Bayless was unmoved.
By itself, concrete is rather weak and requires strengthening by adding metal rods called re-bar. Bayless once again inserted himself into the dam’s construction by limiting the amount of metal rods used in the body of the dam and those used to anchor it to the rock layers beneath it. The temperature at which concrete is poured is also integral to its strength. As construction labored on into the colder months, concrete being poured took longer to possess its full strength.
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| The dam under construction |
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| Snapped and bent rebar protruding from the broken dam Author's Photo |
By December 1st, the 540 ft. long and nearly 50ft. high dam was finished and began impounding water for the mill. Not long after its completion, vertical cracks became visible along the face of the dam that divided it into distinct sections. Contraction of the uncured concrete was found to be the cause and written off as just superficial.
 |
| The completed dam |
Just one month after its completion, Mother Nature provided a warning that foreshadowed the future catastrophe. In January 1910, heavy rain combine and snow melt filled the reservoir to beyond capacity, forcing water over the spillway for the first time. A properly constructed dam should have been able to withstand this pressure, however this dam was anything but that.
Unable to hold back the mass of water behind it, a part of the dam was physically pushed downstream several inches. Large quantities of water were also observed seeping from underneath the structure. Water needed to be released immediately to avoid a complete failure. With no relief valves, water could not be discharged manually. The capped pipe that ran through the dam was inaccessible, as the cap, located at the base of the spillway, was now behind a wall of water now pouring over the dam.
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| The dam after the partial failure |
The solution to the problem was not surprising given the mentality of George C. Bayless. Dynamite was used to blast a hole below the crest of the dam. Another charge was lowered on a rope to blow the cap off the outlet pipe at the base of the dam. Water streamed through these openings and averted a potential disaster.
 |
| The dam after dynamite had been used to lower the reservoir |
Hatten blamed the incident on two factors. The first was insufficiently cured concrete due to cold temperatures. Seepage under the dam was the second catalyst, which had enabled the dam to slide upon its own foundation. Following the incident, Hatten advised adding a rock buttress to strengthen the dam. Bayless promptly ignored it. Within a month’s time, the dam was repaired and was once again holding back water, however significant leakage from under the dam continued. For Bayless it was back to business as normal. Mother Nature had given George Bayless a warning that his dam was structurally unsound. Bayless allowed this warning to go unheeded. She would not be this courteous a second time...
Heavy rains once again filled the reservoir in mid-September 1911. This was the first time since the partial failure in January 1910 that the dam had been stressed by such a force. By the 30th, it was reported that the water level was within a half-inch of the spillway. Opening the outlet pipe was deemed unnecessary as it would hamper production at the mill.
Around 2:15 PM, the dam could no longer hold back the 200 million gallons pushing against it. It instantaneously failed, fracturing into sections as it burst. A wave of water over 20ft high began rushing the 1 1/2 miles towards Austin. Clara Brooks, the owner of a brothel above the dam, witnessed the failure and telephoned downtown Austin to warn them of the approaching danger.
 |
| The dam following the disaster |
Bayless' paper mill was the first to suffer the wrath of the flood. It picked up logs neatly stacked behind the mill and transformed them into missiles that shattered anything in their path. This unstoppable force then reached the town itself. Within seconds, Austin was reduced to matchsticks. Now filled with debris, the surge continued downstream until it met the village of Costello. Here the devastation was repeated on a similar level.
 |
| An example of what was left of Austin after the disaster |
When the water receded and residents returned to what had been their homes, the arduous task of locating the victims began. At least 78 lives are known to have perished, although we may never know the true number of fatalities. Damages were estimated at $3-6 million, or $76-150 million in today’s dollars.
An investigation was launched into the cause of the failure. What was found was essentially a repeat of the January 1910 incident only on a more catastrophic scale. The dam had slid upon its own foundation caused by water seeping under the dam. One of the investigators concluded that, “failure of this dam is due to sliding as a result of faulty foundation, faulty design, faulty construction, and faulty operation.”
Societal factors also contributed to the disaster. Bayless’ mill provided employment for the town of Austin. Economic dependence kept townspeople from confronting Bayless about the unsafe dam following the 1910 partial failure. One of the few that spoke up was local grocer and politician William Nelson. Several times he confronted the paper company to lower the dam and conduct repairs. Nelson’s pleas for action were ignored and he was mocked by his fellow citizens when he tried to forewarn them that the town was in imminent danger. Nelson and his wife later perished in the disaster.
The findings of the investigation ultimately led to the state of Pennsylvania adopting dam safety regulations two years later in 1913. These regulations gave the state the authority to oversee dam design, construction, and operation. Hatten placed all the blame upon himself rather than on George Bayless. He was never charged for the disaster. Bayless was indicted on manslaughter charges, but these were later dismissed.
 |
| The massive dam was pushed aside by the wall of water Author's Photo |
The survivors of Austin and Costello eventually rebuilt their towns, but neither would ever be the same. Nothing could bring back what that warm September day had taken. Bayless’ mill was rebuilt and continued to operate into the 1940’s, before flooding and eventually fire silenced it forever. Both towns still exist today in the quiet picturesque wilderness of Potter County. Though the physical scars of the disaster have long since faded, the faces and the names lost on that day will never be forgotten. The fractured dam still sits in the exact same position it was when it failed over a century ago. It’s now a central part of the Austin Dam Memorial Park, which is dedicated to telling the story of this tragic event.
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| A view of the dam. Rt 872 lies in the background above the dam Author's Photo |
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| What remains of the spillway Author's Photo |
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| The known victims of the Austin Dam Disaster Author's Photo |
Information Retrieved From:
Guidon, M. (2010). The dam that could not break, austin 1911. Retrieved from http://pabook2.libraries.psu.edu/palitmap/AustinDam.html
Jones, A. (2013, September) Memorial marker at base of Austin Dam recalls flood. The Bradford Era. Retrieved From http://www.bradfordera.com/news/memorial-marker-at-base-of-austin-dam-recalls-flood/article_85445dfe-2971-11e3-b701-001a4bcf887a.html
Pashek Associates, & Abertin Vernon, (2011).
The dam park at austin: master plan and economic development strategies. Retrieved from https://planningpa.org/wp-content/uploads/The-Dam-Park-at-Austin-Master-Plan.pdf
Rose, Andrew T., "Using the 1911 Austin Dam Failure Case History in Undergraduate Teaching" (2013). International Conference on Case Histories in Geotechnical Engineering. 46. https://scholarsmine.mst.edu/icchge/7icchge/session01/46
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