![]() |
| The ruins of the infamous dam that caused the Austin Flood |
Remember playing with dominos? At some point in our lives, all of us have made a long line of neatly stacked dominoes. If you did everything right, once you toppled the first domino, the entire line would follow suit in a spectacular chain reaction. In the end, there was always quite a mess to clean up.
Engineering disasters are, to a degree, a lot like this simple form of amusement. Rarely are they the work of a singular cause, but rather are the product of multiple factors that when linked together at the right time and the right place culminate in destruction. Unbeknownst to the residents of a bustling lumber town in northcentral Pennsylvania, their community laid at the end of a domino chain of disaster that once set in motion, would change it forever.
The man ultimately responsible for setting this ill-fated domino chain in action was George Corbett Bayless. Born to John and Amanda Bayless of Corbettville, New York in 1862, George would live a life of privilege and wealth. After completing public schooling, he continued his education at a private institution in Massachusetts. Upon graduation, George would immediately jump into the business world by working at his father’s acid company.
For George Bayless, Austin was the perfect place to build a new paper mill. Such an operation required two critical resources, water and pulp wood. Freeman Run, the principle water source in the valley, could fulfill that necessity. While much of region’s trees had been taken for lumber, toppings and smaller diameter trees left behind could be utilized for pulp wood. A new mill would benefit the town as well. Residents could see that the nearby forests were quickly being depleted and the addition of another industry would provide jobs well after the sawmills closed.
By 1901 the mill was in operation. Though not required to power the mill, water in immense quantities was required for the paper making process. During normal operations, Freeman Run provided the necessary water, however droughts and periods of low water could dampen production. An earthen dam was constructed a mile upstream to form a reservoir that could be utilized during these periods. The dam stretched 365ft across the valley floor and was designed to hold 25,000,000 gallons of water.
Shortcomings of the mill dam soon became evident. In August 1906, the mill was forced to shutdown due to an insufficient water supply, a first for the company. Hundreds of employees were laid off until the reservoir could refill. To prevent such inconveniences, George Bayless knew he needed a larger dam.
Bayless hired Thomas Chalkley Hatten, a dam engineer from Wilmington Delaware, to design a larger dam that would fulfill the needs of his mill. The firm of C.J. Britnall & Co of Binghamton, NY commenced construction of the new dam in May 1909 and completed it in December of that same year. Situated 800 feet downstream from the first dam, the massive structure stretched 534 feet across and towered almost 50 feet above the valley floor. Rather than earth and stone, the dam was comprised of 15,780 cubic yards of concrete. Even today, pouring such an amount would require 1,578 loaded concrete mixer trucks and is the equivalent to filling five Olympic sized swimming pools. This immense mass was required as being a "gravity type" dam, it relied on its shear mass to counteract the force of the 200,000,000 gallons of water behind it.
George Bayless had budgeted $85,000 for the project, but as construction costs continued to mount, it was apparent that the project would quickly surpass that amount. George, being the shrewd businessman that he was, decided to intervene to reduce costs. Bayless pressured Hatton to make alterations to his initial design that included: reducing the length and quantity of metal reinforcing rods used to strengthen the concrete and anchor it to the bedrock, reduction of an underground key wall to prevent the dam from sliding from11feet deep to 4 feet deep, raising the height of the spillway and crest to increase capacity, and eliminating an emergency release valve in favor of a simple cap. Final costs came to $86,000 or about $2.8 billion in modern currency.
Snow-melt and rain filled the dam to capacity on January 21st, 1910. The next day, a landslide on the east abutment revealed water flowing out of the embankment. Water was also observed bubbling up downstream from the dam, a sign that water was infiltrating underneath the structure. On January 23rd, the dam and its foundation were physically pushed 18 inches out of center at the base and 31 inches at the top, bulging out the dam and cracking it in several places.
To avert disaster, Bayless ordered a notch blown in the dam to relieve pressure. However, even this was not deemed sufficient and the cap on the outflow pipe at the base of the dam was blasted off as well. This last-ditch measure prevented a complete failure of the dam. Repairs began immediately. In the meantime, a 30ft. tall timber-crib dam was constructed further upstream to supply water to the mill and allow workers to make repairs on the concrete dam. After just five months, the timber-crib dam exhibited significant amounts of seepage from under it. So much in fact that it had to be drained and repaired.
While repairs to the concrete dam were underway, Thomas Hatton concluded that the failure had resulted from insufficiently cured concrete due to cold weather and water seeping under the dam causing rock layers to shift. He prepared recommendations to add a rock buttress to reinforce the dam and install an underground wall to prevent water seeping underneath it.
Operations at the mill resumed and all seemed normal until mid-September 1911. Heavy rains filled the dam to just below the lip of the spillway, the highest it had been since the previous partial failure. Seepage under and through the dam was obvious in several places. When it was suggested that some water be released, mill management rebuked the suggestion on the grounds that it would dampen production at the mill.
On September 30th, at approximately 2:30 pm, the concrete dam broke apart instantaneously, releasing a monstrous wave of over 200 million gallons of water towards Austin and the mill. Cora Brooks, a societal outcast who ran a brothel near the dam, watched as the dam failed. She immediately began calling every phone number in Austin to warn of the approaching wave of water. The whistle at the paper mill was blown as a warning. Workers scrambled to evacuate the mill as the water bore down on them. The roughly 300,000 cords of wood stored at the mill now became missiles that decimated anything in their path.
When the wave of water and debris reached Austin approximately 10 minutes later, it was like the entire town had been fed into a meat grinder. Water continued down the narrow valley to the tannery town of Costello, where this destruction was repeated. Between 78-85 lives were lost in the disaster; the real number may never be known. As survivors began searching for missing loved ones, fingers began to be pointed towards George Bayless.
By 1911, Bayless' mill was becoming the only major source of employment for Austin, where 1 out of every 10 residents worked there. Bayless knew the town depended on his mill for jobs and soon announced that he would rebuild the mill. He simultaneously passed around an agreement to his surviving employees that promised employment at the new mill if they didn't take legal action against him.
Suits that were filed by family members who had lost loved ones were settled out of court where Bayless agreed to pay a percentage of the damages and make up the balance with stock in the company. Bayless's justification for this was that paying the full amounts would bankrupt the company, a result the town could not afford.
True to his word, Bayless set in motion plans to rebuild the mill. It was decided to not rebuild the concrete dam, leaving its remnants to lay exactly as they were that fateful September day. The ultimate cause for the dam's failure is best captured by the words of Prof. Frank P. McKibben, Director of Engineering at Lehigh University, who was hired by the Potter County district attorney to investigate the cause of the dam's failure. Professor McKibben stated, "the failure of this dam is due to sliding as a result of of faulty foundation, faulty design, faulty construction, and faulty operation." A member of the Boston Society of Civil Engineers who also studied the disaster stated that if he was placed in the same position of building a dam on such a faulty foundation, "the first thing I would do would be to indulge in a season of prayer."
Regardless of the cold winter, construction of the new 200×600ft. main building was completed in just 130 days. Constructing the new mill had required 18 railroad cars of brick, 450 tons of steel supports, 152,000lbs. of concrete, 110,000 square feet of roofing material, 600 million feet of lumber, and 370 skylights. Water for the new mill was supplied by the timber crib dam that had been built after the original dam had partially failed in 1910. In March 1912 the company was reorganized as the Bayless Manufacturing Corporation.
On March 3, 1923 George Corbett Bayless passed away at the age of 61. He was buried in Spring Forest Cemetery in Binghamton, New York. A short biography of his life described him as “ a gentleman in the best sense of the word, sympathetic, loyal, honorable and likable.” His son Stanley Corbett Bayless assumed control of the company.
In 1933, the company went bankrupt and was sold to Veta Mines Inc., who the operated it as the Williamson Pulp & Paper Company. A &P Corrugated Box Corp later took over the mill in January 1941. Operations appear checkered based on the few sources available. By September, three shifts were working six days a week, producing 470 tons of paper a month.
On July 18, 1942, heavy rains inundated the north-central Pennsylvania. Some areas received 30 inches within 24 hours and set creek level records that still stand to this day. In Austin, the 32-year-old timber-crib dam above the paper mill was over-topped. It soon failed, releasing the entire reservoir of 65,000,000 gallons towards Austin and the mill.
The last domino had finally fallen and the end result was fatal for Austin. Repeated dam failures and the loss of the mill precipitated a population decline in Austin. Following the 1911 disaster, the town dropped to 1,500 residents, or about half of the pre-disaster population. After the 1942 dam failure, another 23% of the population left town. What had once been a rather self-sufficient community was reduced to shadow of what it once was. Today, the population of the "town too tough to die" stands at less than 500 residents.
Information Retrieved From:
https://books.google.com/books?id=dBNQAQAAIAAJ&pg=RA4-PA9&dq=bayless+pulp+and+paper+mill+%2B+Freeman+Run&hl=en&newbks=1&newbks_redir=0&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwj-wuacsvSPAxW86ckDHZzUGF0Q6AF6BAgKEAM#v=onepage&q=bayless%20pulp%20and%20paper%20mill%20%2B%20Freeman%20Run&f=false
https://books.google.com/books?id=k7iRHzcHT-UC&pg=PA282&dq=bayless+dam+%2B+cutoff+wall&hl=en&newbks=1&newbks_redir=0&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwiZy9aAivWPAxUY5MkDHR2bA6gQ6AF6BAgOEAM#v=onepage&q=bayless%20dam%20%2B%20cutoff%20wall&f=false
The man ultimately responsible for setting this ill-fated domino chain in action was George Corbett Bayless. Born to John and Amanda Bayless of Corbettville, New York in 1862, George would live a life of privilege and wealth. After completing public schooling, he continued his education at a private institution in Massachusetts. Upon graduation, George would immediately jump into the business world by working at his father’s acid company.
| George Corbett Bayless Image Retrieved From: Binghamton and Boone County, New York: A History |
In 1882, with the help of this brother Franklin, George formed the Bayless Paper Company of Binghamton, NY. George took a break from business in 1887 when he was elected mayor of Binghamton. At 24 years old, he was the youngest person in the city's history to be elected to that position. After a year in politics, George returned to his company. In 1893, George and Franklin reorganized their business as the Bayless Pulp and Paper Company.
Ambition drove George to expand his business in 1900, a decision that brought him to a bustling lumber town in Potter County. The borough of Austin had been formed just over a decade before, a product of Pennsylvania’s logging boom. What had started as a small collection of rudimentary dwellings was now a bustling town of almost 3,000 residents. Despite suffering through outbreaks and four devastating fires, the town rebounded and thrived as a center of industry and prosperity in the region.
Ambition drove George to expand his business in 1900, a decision that brought him to a bustling lumber town in Potter County. The borough of Austin had been formed just over a decade before, a product of Pennsylvania’s logging boom. What had started as a small collection of rudimentary dwellings was now a bustling town of almost 3,000 residents. Despite suffering through outbreaks and four devastating fires, the town rebounded and thrived as a center of industry and prosperity in the region.
![]() |
| Austin in 1890 Image Retrieved From: The Archives of the Railroad Museum of Pennsylvania |
For George Bayless, Austin was the perfect place to build a new paper mill. Such an operation required two critical resources, water and pulp wood. Freeman Run, the principle water source in the valley, could fulfill that necessity. While much of region’s trees had been taken for lumber, toppings and smaller diameter trees left behind could be utilized for pulp wood. A new mill would benefit the town as well. Residents could see that the nearby forests were quickly being depleted and the addition of another industry would provide jobs well after the sawmills closed.
By 1901 the mill was in operation. Though not required to power the mill, water in immense quantities was required for the paper making process. During normal operations, Freeman Run provided the necessary water, however droughts and periods of low water could dampen production. An earthen dam was constructed a mile upstream to form a reservoir that could be utilized during these periods. The dam stretched 365ft across the valley floor and was designed to hold 25,000,000 gallons of water.
![]() |
| The spillway of the first dam Author's Photo |
![]() |
| Remnants of the mill's bleaching tanks. Author's Photo |
Shortcomings of the mill dam soon became evident. In August 1906, the mill was forced to shutdown due to an insufficient water supply, a first for the company. Hundreds of employees were laid off until the reservoir could refill. To prevent such inconveniences, George Bayless knew he needed a larger dam.
Bayless hired Thomas Chalkley Hatten, a dam engineer from Wilmington Delaware, to design a larger dam that would fulfill the needs of his mill. The firm of C.J. Britnall & Co of Binghamton, NY commenced construction of the new dam in May 1909 and completed it in December of that same year. Situated 800 feet downstream from the first dam, the massive structure stretched 534 feet across and towered almost 50 feet above the valley floor. Rather than earth and stone, the dam was comprised of 15,780 cubic yards of concrete. Even today, pouring such an amount would require 1,578 loaded concrete mixer trucks and is the equivalent to filling five Olympic sized swimming pools. This immense mass was required as being a "gravity type" dam, it relied on its shear mass to counteract the force of the 200,000,000 gallons of water behind it.
![]() |
| The newly completed concrete dam. The first dam can be seen in the background |
Almost immediately after construction was complete, two 1/16 inch cracks in the concrete appeared stretching the entire height of the dam, a foreboding sign of the structure's integrity. Bayless then had the dam immediately filled, rather than wait a sufficient time to allow the concrete to fully cure.
| The completed dam holding back water. Note the ice on the dam breast indicating seepage through cracks in the concrete. |
The design and construction of the dam were not the only flaws. 400 million years earlier, alternating layers of slate, clay, and sandstone formed beneath the ground of the future dam site. Unlike solid bedrock, this geologic sandwich allowed water to infiltrate through the layers of slate and clay. Water can lubricate layers of rock allowing them to move over each other. Investigation of the underlying rock layers was conducted before construction began and determined by Hatton to be sufficient.
Snow-melt and rain filled the dam to capacity on January 21st, 1910. The next day, a landslide on the east abutment revealed water flowing out of the embankment. Water was also observed bubbling up downstream from the dam, a sign that water was infiltrating underneath the structure. On January 23rd, the dam and its foundation were physically pushed 18 inches out of center at the base and 31 inches at the top, bulging out the dam and cracking it in several places.
![]() |
| The bulging dam during the 1910 failure. |
To avert disaster, Bayless ordered a notch blown in the dam to relieve pressure. However, even this was not deemed sufficient and the cap on the outflow pipe at the base of the dam was blasted off as well. This last-ditch measure prevented a complete failure of the dam. Repairs began immediately. In the meantime, a 30ft. tall timber-crib dam was constructed further upstream to supply water to the mill and allow workers to make repairs on the concrete dam. After just five months, the timber-crib dam exhibited significant amounts of seepage from under it. So much in fact that it had to be drained and repaired.
![]() |
| The notch blown in the dam to release water |
While repairs to the concrete dam were underway, Thomas Hatton concluded that the failure had resulted from insufficiently cured concrete due to cold weather and water seeping under the dam causing rock layers to shift. He prepared recommendations to add a rock buttress to reinforce the dam and install an underground wall to prevent water seeping underneath it.
![]() |
| A diagram of the dam showing cracks after the 1910 partial failure Image Retrieved From: The Archives of the Railroad Museum of Pennsylvania |
Bayless promptly ignored Hatton's recommendations. When repairs were concluded, Bayless had the reservoir refilled to almost capacity without any negative response from the dam. To him, this was all the evidence he needed to declare the dam was still safe. Modern engineers argue that even if Hatton's recommendations were instituted, complete failure in the future was still almost certain.
Operations at the mill resumed and all seemed normal until mid-September 1911. Heavy rains filled the dam to just below the lip of the spillway, the highest it had been since the previous partial failure. Seepage under and through the dam was obvious in several places. When it was suggested that some water be released, mill management rebuked the suggestion on the grounds that it would dampen production at the mill.
On September 30th, at approximately 2:30 pm, the concrete dam broke apart instantaneously, releasing a monstrous wave of over 200 million gallons of water towards Austin and the mill. Cora Brooks, a societal outcast who ran a brothel near the dam, watched as the dam failed. She immediately began calling every phone number in Austin to warn of the approaching wave of water. The whistle at the paper mill was blown as a warning. Workers scrambled to evacuate the mill as the water bore down on them. The roughly 300,000 cords of wood stored at the mill now became missiles that decimated anything in their path.
When the wave of water and debris reached Austin approximately 10 minutes later, it was like the entire town had been fed into a meat grinder. Water continued down the narrow valley to the tannery town of Costello, where this destruction was repeated. Between 78-85 lives were lost in the disaster; the real number may never be known. As survivors began searching for missing loved ones, fingers began to be pointed towards George Bayless.
![]() |
| Austin after the flood |
By 1911, Bayless' mill was becoming the only major source of employment for Austin, where 1 out of every 10 residents worked there. Bayless knew the town depended on his mill for jobs and soon announced that he would rebuild the mill. He simultaneously passed around an agreement to his surviving employees that promised employment at the new mill if they didn't take legal action against him.
![]() |
| The known victims of the Austin Dam Disaster Author's Photo |
Suits that were filed by family members who had lost loved ones were settled out of court where Bayless agreed to pay a percentage of the damages and make up the balance with stock in the company. Bayless's justification for this was that paying the full amounts would bankrupt the company, a result the town could not afford.
![]() |
| The dam following the disaster |
True to his word, Bayless set in motion plans to rebuild the mill. It was decided to not rebuild the concrete dam, leaving its remnants to lay exactly as they were that fateful September day. The ultimate cause for the dam's failure is best captured by the words of Prof. Frank P. McKibben, Director of Engineering at Lehigh University, who was hired by the Potter County district attorney to investigate the cause of the dam's failure. Professor McKibben stated, "the failure of this dam is due to sliding as a result of of faulty foundation, faulty design, faulty construction, and faulty operation." A member of the Boston Society of Civil Engineers who also studied the disaster stated that if he was placed in the same position of building a dam on such a faulty foundation, "the first thing I would do would be to indulge in a season of prayer."
| An advertisement showing the new mill Image Retrieved from: The Paper Trade Journal |
Regardless of the cold winter, construction of the new 200×600ft. main building was completed in just 130 days. Constructing the new mill had required 18 railroad cars of brick, 450 tons of steel supports, 152,000lbs. of concrete, 110,000 square feet of roofing material, 600 million feet of lumber, and 370 skylights. Water for the new mill was supplied by the timber crib dam that had been built after the original dam had partially failed in 1910. In March 1912 the company was reorganized as the Bayless Manufacturing Corporation.
| The timber crib dam before it was reinforced with dirt Image Retrieved From: Annual Report of the Water Supply Commission of PA |
Two years after the Austin Dam Disaster, the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania enacted Act No. 555 that granted regulatory powers to the Water Supply Commission. Permits from the commission were now required to construct a dam or any water obstruction, a process previously unheard of across the United States. Had this regulatory power been in place years prior, the disaster may have been averted.
By 1916, the plant was producing 65-70 tons of paper daily with an annual production of 20,000 tons. The following year, a Jenssen acid tower was added to the plant. This structure, composed of hollow concrete towers, produced sulfite acid liquor to break down wood fibers during the paper-making process. Limestone, water, and sulfur were mixed inside the hollow concrete towers to produce the mixture.
![]() |
| The mill's Jenssen acid tower Author's Photo |
On March 3, 1923 George Corbett Bayless passed away at the age of 61. He was buried in Spring Forest Cemetery in Binghamton, New York. A short biography of his life described him as “ a gentleman in the best sense of the word, sympathetic, loyal, honorable and likable.” His son Stanley Corbett Bayless assumed control of the company.
In 1933, the company went bankrupt and was sold to Veta Mines Inc., who the operated it as the Williamson Pulp & Paper Company. A &P Corrugated Box Corp later took over the mill in January 1941. Operations appear checkered based on the few sources available. By September, three shifts were working six days a week, producing 470 tons of paper a month.
| The mill as it appeared in 1938 Image Retrieved From:http://maps.psiee.psu.edu |
When the wall of water reached the town, entire buildings were pushed off their foundations. Thankfully residents had evacuated before the dam failed and no lives were lost. Legal action was initiated by the residents of Austin on grounds that A&P had been negligent in its maintenance of the dam. In the end, the company was found liable for the damages and restitution for the damage was mandated. This double blow spelled the end of the mill after 44 years of operation. Demolition of the plant began in April 1943. A fire of unknown origins gutted what remained of the mill that December.
| The mill site as it appears today Image Retrieved From Google Maps |
The last domino had finally fallen and the end result was fatal for Austin. Repeated dam failures and the loss of the mill precipitated a population decline in Austin. Following the 1911 disaster, the town dropped to 1,500 residents, or about half of the pre-disaster population. After the 1942 dam failure, another 23% of the population left town. What had once been a rather self-sufficient community was reduced to shadow of what it once was. Today, the population of the "town too tough to die" stands at less than 500 residents.
![]() |
| The interior of the former stock house Author's Photo |
Austin (Bayless) Dam (Pennsylvania, 1911).(2019). Retrieved from https://damfailures.org/case-study/austin-bayless-dam-pennsylvania-1911/
Beebe, V. (1934). History of Potter County, Pennsylvania. Potter County Historical Society. Retrieved from: https://digital.libraries.psu.edu/digital/collection/digitalbks2/id/9468
Cameron County Press. (1904, June 9). Local department. Pennsylvania Newspaper Archive. Retrieved from: https://panewsarchive.psu.edu/lccn/sn83032040/1904-06-09/ed-1/seq-5/#city=&rows=20&proxtext=austin+pulp+mill&searchType=basic&sequence=0&index=2&words=Austin+mill+pulp&page=1
Cameron County Press. (1905, April 6). The county. Pennsylvania Newspaper Archive. Retrieved From: https://panewsarchive.psu.edu/lccn/sn83032040/1905-04-06/ed-1/seq-8/#city=&rows=20&proxtext=austin+pulp+mill&searchType=basic&sequence=0&index=4&words=Austin+mill+pulp&page=1
Department of the Interior (1952). Notable Local Floods of 1942-43. Retrieved from https://www.google.com/books/edition/Geological_Survey_Water_supply_Paper/0iJEB9fELsYC?hl=en&gbpv=1
Harrisburg Telegraph. (1916, January 6). Millionaire chooses jail to await outgrowth of Austin Flood charges. Pennsylvania Newspaper Archive. Retrieved from: https://panewsarchive.psu.edu/lccn/sn85038411/1916-01-07/ed-1/seq-2/#date1=01%2F01%2F1789&city=&date2=12%2F31%2F2010&searchType=advanced&language=&sequence=0&index=0&words=Bayless+manslaughter&county=&frequency=&ortext=&proxtext=&phrasetext=&andtext=bayless+manslaughter&rows=20&dateFilterType=yearRange&page=1
Hills Publishing Company. Rapid winter work in rebuilding the Bayless pulp mill at Austin, Penna. Engineering News, 67. 159-160. Retrieved from: https://www.google.com/books/edition/Engineering_News/bilKAQAAMAAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1&bsq=austin
Lant, I. (n.d.). The Austin reader: the first one hundred years.
Largey, Gale. "The Austin Disaster 1911: A Chronicle of Human Character"
Paper Inc. (1917) Jenssen two tower acid system. Paper, 19. 26. Retrieved from https://www.google.com/books/edition/Paper/p6wfAQAAMAAJ?hl=en&gbpv=0
Pennsylvania Water Supply Commission. (1912). Annual Report of the Water Supply Commission. Retrieved from: https://www.google.com/books/edition/Report_of_the_Water_Supply_Commission_of/K_lKAAAAMAAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1
Pennsylvania Water Supply Commission. (1912). Annual Report of the Water Supply Commission. Retrieved from: https://www.google.com/books/edition/Report_of_the_Water_Supply_Commission_of/G9NMAQAAMAAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1
Poor's Manual Company (1917). Poor's Manual of Industrials 1917. Retrieved from https://www.google.com/books/edition/Poor_s_Manual_of_Industrials_Manufacturi/CmY3AQAAMAAJ?hl=en&gbpv=0
Seward,W.(1924). Binghamton and Broome County New York: A History. Retrieved from https://www.google.com/books/edition/Binghamton_and_Broome_County_New_York/VdMn8wXJ5iUC?hl=en&gbpv=1
https://damfailures.org/sites/default/files/wp-pdf/The-Bayless-Dam-Failure.pdf
https://jvbrownpublic.advantage-preservation.com/viewer/?k=austin%20paper%20mill&i=f&d=01011912-12311945&m=between&ord=k1&fn=grit_usa_pennsylvania_williamsport_19420719_english_27&df=1&dt=10&cid=2885














Paper and Paper Pulp Testing Machine Exporter - Paper and Paper Pulp Testing Machine Exporter provides specialized equipment used for testing the quality and properties of paper and pulp materials. These machines evaluate factors like strength, durability, and composition, ensuring industry standards are met. Exporters cater to global markets, supporting paper manufacturing industries with advanced testing technology. Visit: Paper Testing Machine Exporter
ReplyDeletePulp Testing Machine Exporter
My uncle, aunt and cousin first showed me this dam site when I was probably 6
ReplyDelete